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CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND
CORPORATE TORT LIABILITY
CATHARINE PIERCE WELLS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Many late nineteenth-century law teachers thought of the com-
mon law as a logical system based upon legal premises that yielded
determinate-and correct-legal outcomes. Late twentieth century
teachers tend to give a somewhat different account. They see com-
mon law decisionmaking as the application of a relatively compelling
set of social policies to the resolution of individual cases. Thus, in
teaching torts, many of us tell a deceptively simple story. There are
three basic goals of tort law, we suggest: First, there is deterrence
which requires that we formulate tort law in such a way that the fear
of legal liability deters unsafe conduct; second, there is corrective jus-
tice which requires that we make a fair adjustment between the par-
ties; and third, there is the goal of redistribution which requires that
we find a deep pocket defendant who can either pay for the accident
without hardship or can spread the costs among large numbers of peo-
ple. Under this analysis, controversy in the tort law centers around
the general question of whether some or all of these polices are appro-
priate goals for tort law and around the narrower question of whether
some particular outcome accomplishes a particular goal.
In the context of this account, it is obvious that questions of de-
terrence can be quite complex. At first blush, it may seem that a
higher standard of due care is good because it will result in greater
precautions. On the other hand, further reflection reveals that high
standards may increase precautions beyond efficient levels. Indeed,
the issue becomes even more confounded when we consider a host of
secondary effects that tort rules have on the activities of others. Be-
yond these complications, it is obvious-although rarely discussed-
* Associate Dean of Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Boston College Law
School. B.A. 1968, Wellesley College; M.A. 1973, Ph.D. 1981, University of California, Berke-
ley; J.D. 1976, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Jennifer Arlen and Stephanie Wildman for
their help and encouragement.
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that deterrence analysis must take into account the corporate form of
most defendants. Corporate actors are imperfect agents' and liability
rules do not necessarily have their desired effects upon real world cor-
porate decisionmaking. To predict real world corporate behavior, it is
necessary to determine who the corporate decisionmaker is and what
the particular incentives are that govern his or her decisionmaking. If
liability judgments are years down the road and the decisionmaker is
rewarded for present cost savings, then the general incentives of the
tort law may well give way to the more particular motivations of this
particular agent. In short, liability rules that promote greater care in
the case of individual defendants may or may not have the same effect
on corporate defendants. Thus, corporate tort liability poses special
problems for deterrence analysis.
My particular job for this symposium is to think about the analo-
gous problem with respect to a corrective justice analysis. I will there-
fore be concerned with cases where the tort defendant is a corporation
and I will consider whether the corporate form of these defendants
makes any difference to, our judgments about fairness and justice.
This is a question that will take us not into the realm of economics,
but into the murkier depths of political and moral philosophy.
II. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
Corrective justice questions can be obscured by the fact that the
term "corrective justice" is used in a variety of different ways. In the
tort literature the term is often used to refer to the fault theory of tort
liability. Under this conception, corrective justice requires the cancel-
lation of wrongful gains and losses.2 This may seem to be a plausible
formulation, but the criterion of wrongfulness is difficult to apply in
concrete cases: What are wrongful gains and losses? What particular
kinds of wrongfulness are adequate to justify a tort recovery? Fur-
ther, at this level of generality, the concept of corrective justice may
even be tautologous-when we ask whether particular gains and
losses violate the norms of corrective justice, what we are often really
asking is whether they would constitute an appropriate basis for tort
liability.
1. Alison Grey Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Struc-
ture, 25 UCLA L. REv. 738, 774-77 (1978).
2. Jules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part 11, 2 L. & PrinL
5, 6 (1983).
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The term "corrective justice" may also be used in a more substan-
tive way. For example, two of the great Western philosophers-Aris-
totle and Kant-have used the term to denote a central requirement
of moral and political theory. In this context, corrective justice, to-
gether with its counterpart distributive justice, represent the goal of a
good society. Thus, the term "corrective justice" may be used as a
distinctly philosophical term whose substantive normative content
must be determined in the context of a particular philosophical
theory.
In this article, I will use the term "corrective justice" in its sub-
stantive philosophical sense. It is therefore important for me to say a
few words about the underlying philosophical frameworks that will
supply the context for this discussion. In what follows, I will focus on
two particular conceptions of corrective justice. The first is the Kant-
ian account given by Weinrib in The Idea of Private Law.3 The second
is my own pragmatic account developed in "Tort Law as Corrective
Justice."4 These two accounts analyze the question of corporate liabil-
ity somewhat differently and utilizing them both will provide not only
a fuller understanding of the problems of corporate liability, but also
an instructive contrast between the two ways of thinking about correc-
tive justice.
Perhaps the simplest way to describe the difference between
Weinrib's account and my own is to think of it in terms of the differ-
ence between a top-down theory and the bottom-up variety.' With a
top-down approach, one begins with a systematic normative theory
and applies it to the particular problem at hand. Thus, Weinrib's ac-
count utilizes Kantian moral theory and its corresponding notion of
corrective justice to analyze the various problems of tort liability. By
contrast, a bottom-up approach looks at societal practices of correc-
tive justice decisionmaking and tries to articulate their relationship to
the concept of corrective justice as it is embodied in the particular
culture. The point of the analysis is not so much to provide "answers"
to corrective justice "questions" but rather to provide an evaluation of
3. ERNmST J. WEnrIm, Tim IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 84-113 (1995).
4. Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for
Jury Adjudication, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 2348 (1990).
5. This is not quite the same distinction as the one drawn by Cass R. Sunstein in Incom-
pletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1733, 1748 (1995).
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the underlying practices together with possible prescriptions for
reform.6
These two approaches to the problems of corrective justice are
elsewhere developed at considerable length,7 and I will not attempt to
duplicate those discussions here. Nor will I be able, within the con-
fines of this short paper, to develop a rigorous theory of corrective
justice and corporate liability. Rather, the point of this Article is to
identify fruitful directions along which such a theory could proceed
and to identify some of the issues that it will confront. In what fol-
lows, I will begin by emphasizing three important points that the two
accounts-the Kantian account and the pragmatic account-have in
common. I will then proceed to show how each account approaches
the problem of corporate liability. Obviously, within the confines of
this short paper, I will not be able to deal extensively with many of the
questions that are posed by the attempt to see corporate liability in
corrective justice terms. Rather, the point of this Article is simply to
identify fruitful directions for such an inquiry and to outline some of
the issues that such an inquiry will confront.
First, in both accounts, corrective justice is distinctly about jus-
tice. This may seem obvious, but some people speak as though it is
apparent justice rather than justice itself that is at the center of correc-
tive justice concerns. Corrective justice is not about satisfying the par-
ties or appeasing the masses. It presupposes the notion that justice
and virtue are part of the good life, that they are desirable in them-
selves, and that they are important aspirations for our political lives.
In short, corrective justice presupposes that a good legal system will
include provisions for enforcing the demands of justice among those it
governs. Thus, just as economic analysis assumes the salience of effi-
ciency, corrective justice accounts are based upon a presumed rela-
tionship between the rules of tort liability and our aspirations for a
just society.
The second point is obvious, but it is also something that is fre-
quently overlooked. The concept of "wrongful gains and losses" is
plainly relative to a theory of right and wrong. Thus, theories of cor-
rective justice are inevitably parasitic upon more general normative
theories. Weinrib clearly recognizes this when he provides a Kantian
6. I have developed this point at greater length in my previous article. Wells, supra note
4, at 2361-63.
7. Id. at 2373-93.
1772
1996] CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND CORPORATE TORTS
backdrop for his discussion of corrective justice.' Similarly, in other
writings, I have talked about corrective justice within the context of
pragmatic normative theory.9
The final point is that corrective justice deals with local rather
than global problems. Corrective justice focuses on an occurrence or
transaction that involves specific parties. The dominant consideration
in a corrective justice case is the equities that exist between these par-
ties; the welfare or status of third parties is not a relevant considera-
tion. This approach, of course, contrasts the economic approach
which focuses on maximizing resources not just for the parties, but for
society as a whole. Corrective justice inquiries are also local in the
sense that they require us to confine ourselves to certain types of con-
siderations. What is relevant in a corrective justice case is not the
overall merit of the parties, but rather the moral status of a particular
transaction or occurrence.10
III. THE KANTIAN APPROACH
One of the most detailed and interesting accounts of tort law as
corrective justice is that given by Ernest Weinrib. He explicitly recog-
nizes that corrective justice questions must be addressed within the
context of a larger normative theory' and proposes that the proper
context is the moral and political theories of Immanuel Kant. In this
conception, corrective justice "must refer to some notion of equal
membership in the kingdom of ends and the consequent impermissi-
bility of arbitrary self-preference. It must also eschew reference to the
aggregation of individual utilities which is the hallmark of utilitarian
justification."' 2 This means that a gain or loss is wrongful if it results
from an act taken without due regard for the autonomy of others.
From this, Weinrib argues, a number of consequences follow. First,
negligent acts are wrong because the actor has failed to give due re-
gard to the interests and preoccupations of another.13 Second, there is
no corrective justice basis for imposing strict liability-if due regard is
given, then the act is not wrongful even though it may have harmed
8. WENRIm, supra note 3, at 84-113.
9. NVells, supra note 4, at 2361-63.
10. WpnRm, supra note 3, at 56-61.
11. Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PMiL 37, 40
(1983).
12. Id. at 40.
13. Ld. at 52-53.
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another.'4 Third, tort law should not utilize subjective standards' 5 be-
cause such standards arbitrarily invoke one person's viewpoint at the
expense of others.' 6
Note how a corrective justice theory works for Weinrib. The con-
cept of corrective justice provides a structure for certain types of legal
inquiries. Specifically, it requires that we test the justice of an individ-
ual tort claim using criteria determined by the wrongfulness of the
gains and losses under the auspices of a free standing ethical system.
Thus, relative to Weinrib's choice of a Kantian moral theory, any act
which proceeds from privileging one's own interest or viewpoint over
that of others is wrongful, and corrective justice requires the reversal
of any gains and losses that are caused by such an act. It is within this
context that Weinrib considers the problem of corporate liability.
The issue of corporate liability is closely related to the doctrine of
respondeat superior. The doctrine of respondeat superior permits a re-
covery against an employer for the negligent acts of the employee.
Thus, the recovery is based upon fault (the negligence) of the em-
ployee, but it is directed towards the employer who may or may not
have been personally negligent in the selection or supervision of the
employee. The resulting recoveries have always been problematic.
Weinrib asks the question:
This doctrine, which makes defendants pay for wrongs they have
not committed, has been the subject of much speculation for more
than a century. So far as the employer is concerned, the liability can
be regarded as strict, because the exercise of reasonable care by the
employer to prevent the accident is no defense. Is such liability,
which has proven itself to be difficult for any theory, consistent with
corrective justice?' 7
To which he replies:
Since corrective justice is the normative relationship of sufferer and
doer, respondeat superior fits into corrective justice only if the em-
ployer can, in some sense, be regarded as a doer of the harm. Cor-
rective justice requires us to think that the employee at fault is so
closely associated with the employer that responsibility for the for-
mer's acts can be imputed to the latter.' 8
14. Id. at 57-60.
15. The reasonable person test is an objective and not a subjective standard. This means
that defendants are held to the standard of care exercised by a reasonable person and not the
best judgment of the individual defendant. Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837).
16. Weinrib, supra note 11, at 50-52.
17. WEnRam, supra note 3, at 185.
18. Id. at 186.
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From this, Weinrib concludes that the doctrine of respondeat superior
is not at odds with the requirements of corrective justice. His answer
to the dilemma is that the doctrine sets out two specific circumstances
that are jointly sufficient to attribute the wrongful acts of the em-
ployee to the employer: (1) the employee must be a "servant" and
not an "independent contractor,"19 and (2) the acts must be commit-
ted within the scope of employment. Thus, he states: "Where the
faulty actor is sufficiently integrated into the enterprise and where the
faulty act is sufficiently close to the assigned task, the law constructs a
more inclusive legal persona, the-employer-acting-through-the-em-
ployee, to whom responsibility can be ascribed.
20
Weinrib's analysis of respondeat superior gets us half way to the
question of corporate liability. If Weinrib is right, then there is no
corrective justice problem with vicarious liability for corporate em-
ployers. But this conclusion does not speak specifically to the liability
of corporate defendants.
The troublesome nature of corporate liability does not merely
stem from the fact that the corporation itself is not the actual
tortfeasor. For an act to be wrongful, it must be done by a moral
agent. Thus, for example, if a stone falls on someone's head, the stone
is neither legally nor morally responsible for the resulting injury. Are
corporations morally neutral like a stone or do they resemble natural
persons by being the sort of thing to which moral and legal responsi-
bility can be ascribed?
It is important to note that this question of moral agency poses a
serious problem for a Kantian theory like Weinrib's. In Kantian the-
ory, no act can be condemned as immoral without reference to the
reason and autonomy of the actor. Thus, the notion of moral agency
is central and it cannot be ascribed in the absence of human reason
and autonomy. In short, it follows from Kantian morality that gains
are wrongful only when they result from human acts and this in turn
requires that corporate liability be based upon a reductionist theory of
human personality. It is not simply a question of whether the em-
ployer and the employee are closely enough associated that the act of
the one can be attributed to the other. It is also a question of whether
the moral status of the human agent can be attributed to the corporate
19. I put these terms in scare quotes because they are terms of art under tort law. See W.
PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70, at 501 and § 71, at 509 (5th ed. 1984).
20. WENRmI, supra note 3, at 187.
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principal. In Kantian terms, a corporate act may only be seen as
wrongful if we attribute to the corporation the autonomy and the ca-
pability for reason that belong to its human owners and employees.
The problem that corporate liability poses for Weinrib is as fol-
lows: On the one hand, the fact that corporations are a dominant fea-
ture of modem economic life means that there are a whole host of
policy reasons for making them liable for harms that are caused by
their agents or from which the corporations may have profited. The
law recognizes these policy reasons by creating the fiction that corpo-
rations are legal persons and by allowing them to be sued and held
liable in the same way that natural persons are sued and held liable.
On the other hand, if we systematically reduce questions of legal lia-
bility to questions of moral accountability then this "host of policy
reasons" ceases to be salient. What matters with respect to a system-
atic moral system such as Kant's is not informal considerations of con-
venience and fairness, but rather the more formal requirements of
moral judgment. A Kantian analysis requires us to tackle the difficult
problem of corporate moral agency yet this does not seem to be the
true location of the problem. Even if it were clear that corporations
were not true moral agents, I doubt that we would abolish the notion
of corporate liability. Ultimately, the problem with a formal account
of corrective justice is that it does not conform to the practical reali-
ties of legal arrangements. The law must be reflexive and responsible
to the needs of human life, and thus its substance cannot be reduced
to the inflexible requirements of an a priori moral system.
Note that the above difficulty is not the inevitable result of intro-
ducing moral considerations into the tort law. There is nothing in this
argument that prevents us from employing moral norms and judg-
ments in applying tort liability. The difficulty only arises when we at-
tempt to specify the legal content of corrective justice by applying a
rigid moral system in a top-down fashion. Such an application inevita-
bly yields a rigid-and therefore unrealistic-approach to the prob-
lem of corrective justice.
IV. THE PRAGMATIC APPROACH
In contrast to the top-down method of the Kantian approach, a
pragmatic analysis flows from a bottom-up application of pragmatic
normative theory to the problem of corrective justice. A pragmatic
normative theory does not begin with abstract principles. Instead, it
begins with a painstaking examination of real world practices. Thus,
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with respect to corrective justice, the analysis starts with a description
of the practices which are used to adjudicate corrective justice claims.
It then proceeds to consider these practices in a critical light. Critical
evaluation does not move in a straight line from the articulation of
general normative principles to the assessment of a given case.
Rather it loops through several rounds of inquiry: How can these
practices be best described? What forms of argument might justify
them? What consequences do these forms of justification have for the
reform of the underlying practices? What effect will they have on our
manner of justification?
The general features of tort adjudication are well known. When
not settled, cases are generally tried in courts of law by advocates that
represent each of the parties. Unless waived, each party has a right to
submit their claims to a jury, and generally this means the jury decides
all factual disputes and assesses the defendant's conduct in accordance
with relatively vague standards of liability. I have argued elsewhere
that these adjudicatory practices may be justified by their deeply em-
bedded status in American political life, by their use of community
standards for the basis for decision, and by their use of consensus deci-
sionmaking as a way of ensuring that cases are understood in the con-
text of several different perspectives and viewpoints.2' My purpose
here, however, is not to reexamine these justificatory considerations.
Rather, it is to see what the substance of contemporary jury decision-
making tells us about the corrective justice aspects of corporate
liability.
When we approach the issue in this fashion, it is obvious that we
must begin with empirical observations. What are the trends with re-
spect to corporate liability? From casual inspection of the pages of
The Wall Street Journal, one might conclude that the following three
trends obtain: (1) that courts freely assess damages against corpora-
tions on the basis of vicarious liability, (2) that juries award more gen-
erous verdicts against corporations than they do against individual
litigants, and (3) that there are frequent and large impositions of puni-
tive damages against corporate defendants.22 As a matter of substan-
tive law and actual practice, it is pretty clear that the first of these
21. Wells, supra note 4, at 2393-2410.
22. See, eg., Alex Kozinski, The Case of Punitive Damages v. Democracy, WALL ST. J., Jan.
19, 1995, at A18; Amy Dockser Marcus, Juries Rule Against "Tort Reform" With Huge Awards,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1990, at 1; Kevin Pritchett, Car-Rental Firms Decry Vicarious Blame,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1992, at B1; Jeffery A. Tannenbaum, Franchisers Find Chain's Errors Are
Costly, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1994, at B2.
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statements is true. The other two are less certain-it would be helpful
to have some hard information.3 Nevertheless, for the sake of dem-
onstration, I shall take these statements as true and consider whether
the trend they purport to describe is actually a positive development.
Are these "community standards" expressive of our best aspirations
for corrective justice?"
One way to think about this question is to consider it i' the con-
text of contemporary understandings about the role and responsibility
of business corporations. Indeed, there is some considerable ambiva-
lence in public discussions about this topic. On the one hand, corpo-
rate responsibility is seen as a good thing. Corporations often
describe themselves as good neighbors and responsible members of
the community. They have budgets for charitable contributions and,
in pursuing good will, will sometimes do more than the law requires
by way of protecting their customers and employees. On the other
hand, corporations and their advocates are quick to point out that cor-
porations are really only responsible to their shareholders. Accord-
ingly, profit maximization should be the sole concern of corporate
managers. During the past twenty years, the latter version-the profit
maximization model-has gained momentum and it seems to me that
its ascendancy is relevant to the question of why we do-or should-
hold corporations to increasingly tough standards of tort liability.
Tort law has always sought to walk a fine line between making people
pay for the harms they cause and not, at the same time, placing an
undue burden on their pursuit of human purposes. Corporations are
not human agents. Monetary gain for them is not a means to an end
but an ultimate end for all their activity; their risks are motivated-
and possibly should be motivated-by a rational calculation of the
bottom line. Thus, it makes sense to accord their need for unbur-
dened activity less deference than we extend to human agents whose
activities are more often motivated by needs for achievement, produc-
tivity, fellowship and family life. These non-monetary goals are not
readily translated into economic terms and, for that reason, the tort
system might well be justified in taxing them less severely with the
cost of accidents.
A second thing to consider is the effect of large corporate damage
awards on the economic life of the community. In the last paragraph,
I assumed that corporations could be treated as isolated actors who
23. This is especially true because some empirical studies have found that complaints about
the "generosity" of the tort system are somewhat overstated.
1778
1996] CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND CORPORATE TORTS
are motivated only by the accumulation of wealth. If they retained all
the wealth they accumulated-serving only as creators of investment
capital-then the argument above suggests that tort liability rules
could take this into account in imposing greater liability on corporate
defendants. But it also makes sense to think of corporations as con-
duits rather than actors. As conduits, they seek to maximize wealth
not merely for accumulation, but also for the benefit of human actors
and their human purposes. Thus, it is relevant to ask who or what is
ultimately taxed by tort recoveries-corporate accumulations, cus-
tomers, employees, creditors or stockholders? A realistic answer to
this question would certainly further debate on whether it is desirable
from a corrective justice point of view to impose high standards of
corporate accountability.
A final thing to consider is the desirability of punitive damage
awards. From one point of view, punitive damage awards may seem
to be a last ditch effort to bring corporate risk-taking under control.
The deterrence analysis suggests that an entity whose sole responsibil-
ity is to maximize profits may have little incentive to maintain reason-
able levels of safety if damage awards are uncertain and far enough in
the future to be significantly discounted. Thus, the point of these
damages is to serve as an incentive for private plaintiffs to try to force
internalization of the costs of accidents onto the corporate actors who
cause them.24 There is, however, a lottery aspect to punitive damages
that is troubling in the context of corrective justice. How is corrective
justice served if some victims are excessively compensated while
others are left to bear their losses alone?
This pragmatic analysis of corporate liability looks very different
from the traditional economic or moral analyses of tort law. Cer-
tainly, the foregoing analysis is not sustained enough to give any deti-
sive answers in this area. Nevertheless, it is suggestive of the kind of
normative inquiry that might be effective. The inquiry would proceed
something like this: First, we would study actual jury decisionmaking
to see if we could discern certain patterns and trends with respect to
corporate defendants; second, we would try to understand the reasons
for these trends (we might ask, for example, why it is that juries are
making larger awards against corporate defendants); third, we would
consider what arguments might be offered to justify these trends-
judging them "good" or "bad" or "good in some circumstances and
bad in others." Thus, unlike the top-down formal approach with its
24. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 46-52 (1972).
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rigid application of an a priori moral theory, a pragmatic approach
entails an ongoing dialectic between real world practical considera-
tions of moral theory.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has focused upon a set of questions that are not nor-
mally posed in contemporary tort theory. I have proceeded on the
assumption that the artificial nature of the corporate persona is some-
thing to be taken seriously within the context of corrective justice con-
cerns. I believe that this is true whether we approach these concerns
from the top-down and look at them from the standpoint of moral
agency, or whether we approach them from the bottom-up and con-
sider them in terms of their practical effects on contemporary life. In
closing, I would like to say a little about why I think this is an impor-
tant move for corrective justice analysis to make.
The economic analysis of tort law has gained considerable mo-
mentum in the last twenty-five years. Indeed, it is a very powerful
form of analysis so long as we are comfortable with its underlying as-
sumptions. If all human wants, needs and aspirations are commodifi-
able in monetary terms then an economic approach will yield a
powerful descriptive framework within which normative questions can
be settled. To the extent that we entertain doubts about this assump-
tion,1 the analysis becomes interesting and provocative, but not nec-
essarily decisive. Similarly, with the fiction that corporations can be
treated as legal persons, so long as the fiction is taken as truth, the
problem of corporate liability can be easily handled. It reduces itself,
as Weinrib has shown, to the abstract problem of attributing an
agent's conduct to its principal. But if the fiction is discounted, a
whole new set of questions becomes salient: What are the practical
consequences of corporate liability? What reasons are there for treat-
ing corporate defendants differently from natural persons? What rea-
sons of fairness and convenience justify the choice to hold corporate
defendants to higher standards? Thus it would seem that, whatever
one might think of the more philosophical debate between pragma-
tism and Kantian theory, the pragmatic approach has the advantage of
locating the controversy over corporate liability in a non-fictional
world and addressing it in terms that are both practical and real.
25. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849
(1987) (arguing that inalienable rights should be evaluated based on "our best current under-
standing of the concept of flourishing," rather than an economic analysis).
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